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ABSTRACT
The political and security relationship between India and Southeast Asia (SEA) has 
developed beyond the traditional domain after the Cold War era. As the Cold War ended, 
and new geopolitics were redefined, both parties sought a strategic approach through 
greater engagement with extra-regional partners. Since 2003, both parties have engaged in 
various political partnerships with SEA states and a few security challenges collectively. 
The paper answers the following questions: what is the pattern of this relationship? What 
kind of mechanism has been adopted by both parties in strengthening their relationship? 
Is the factor of China imperative enough to ‘boost’ India’s efforts in reinforcing political 
and security relations with SEA states? Using content analysis, emerging themes from 
relevant literature by selected scholars in the area of India and SEA states’ relations are 
explored. This paper also reviews several governmental documents and official websites. 
In general, some scholars agree that the development of the relationship between India 
and SEA states is important in creating a regional balance with other international actors 
especially China. This paper aims to examine the growing relations between India and 
SEA states in the political and security terms since 2003. The paper suggests that the 
strong political and security relationship between India and SEA states creates an “external 
balancing strategy” to counter-balance the 
presence of China in the region. Meanwhile, 
it also shows that SEA states are turning to 
India as a counterweight to China and the 
US in the region. 
Keywords: India-Southeast Asia relations, maritime 
security, political relation, security cooperation
Hammam Saad AlShawi, Ku Hasnita Ku Samsu, Lee Yok Fee and Zatul Himmah Adnan
2 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 27 (S1): 1 - 13 (2019)
INTRODUCTION 
The political and security relationship 
between India and Southeast Asia (SEA) 
has developed beyond the traditional 
domain after the Cold War era. As the 
Cold War ended and new geopolitics were 
redefined, both parties sought a strategic 
approach through greater engagement 
with extra regional partners. Since 2003, 
both parties have engaged in various 
political partnerships with SEA states and 
a few security challenges collectively. 
The introduction of India’s Look East 
Policy, later rebranded the Act East Policy, 
signaled India’s determination to strengthen 
relations with SEA. Some scholars argue 
that the rising military power of China and 
its assertiveness in the region is one of the 
important mutual challenges for India and 
Southeast Asian countries (Amador et al., 
2011; Blank et al., 2015; Naidu, 2010; 
Pandya & Malone, 2010; Rajendram, 
2014; Yong & Mun, 2009). These scholars 
assert that there is a crucial need for India 
to enhance its political and security ties in 
order to confront mutual threats and counter-
balance China’s rising power in the region 
in particular. 
On the other hand, the approach of 
SEA states towards India is argued to be 
an alignment option for them to balance 
the regional influence of China and the 
United States (Singh 2011; Singh, 2018). 
SEA states are seen seeking on power 
balancing between major powers rather 
than bandwagon. However, few scholars 
argue that using realism and balance of 
power as concepts in understanding the 
regional relations with the major powers is 
no longer significant. They assert that SEA 
states are more independent in managing 
their affairs in the post-Cold War (Archaya, 
2004; Banlaoi, 2003; Circiorari 2008). 
Despite this argument, this paper contends 
that the perspective of balance of power 
is still relevant to explain the nature of 
regional relations with major powers. The 
competition between two major powers i.e. 
China and India, is real as highlighted by 
few scholars (Banlaoi, 2003; Frankel 2011; 
Hong, 2007; Mohan, 2006; Scott, 2008a, 
2008b) and it is impossible for SEA states 
to choose the bandwagon because all the 
states in the region have mutual benefits 
with China and India in various domains. 
It is important to see the development 
of the relations between SEA states and 
major powers to understand and foresee 
the political and security challenges in 
the region, especially with India as a new 
heavyweight player after the Cold War. 
In spite of the variety of interpretation 
of the motive in their relations, most agree 
that both parties have extensively used 
their security and political engagements 
beyond the traditional framework scholars 
( Batabyal, 2006; Brewster, 2013; Muni & 
Mun, 2012; Mohan, 2008; Naidu, 2010; 
Singh, 2011; Southgate, 2015). With this 
in mind, the current paper answers the 
following questions: what is the pattern of 
this relationship? What kind of mechanism 
has been adopted by both parties in 
strengthening their relationship? Is the 
factor of China imperative enough to ‘boost’ 
India’s efforts in reinforcing political and 
security relations with SEA states? 
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Therefore, this paper aims to examine 
the growing relations between India and 
Southeast Asian (SEA) states in the political 
and security domains since 2003. Using 
content analysis, emerging themes from 
relevant literature by selected scholars in the 
area of India and SEA states’ relations were 
explored. This paper also reviews several 
governmental publications (ASEAN, 2010, 
2016; Ministry of External Affairs, 2013, 
2016) including official websites such as 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of India 
and Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). Searching themes in these data 
sources were based on selected keywords 
(e.g. India-Southeast Asia relations, political 
relation, security cooperation, maritime 
security and strategic relations between 
India and SEA). The discussion of this 
paper is divided into three sections. In the 
first section provides a brief background 
and explanation of the changing directions 
of India towards Southeast Asia region 
after the Cold War. The second and third 
sections focus on two major types of the 
relationships between India and Southeast 
Asia, namely political partnerships and 
security cooperation. 
POST-COLD WAR AND INDIA’S 
LOOK EAST POLICY
This section discusses a brief background 
of India’s direction towards Southeast 
Asian countries after the Cold War. SEA 
states became the core point of India’s 
foreign policy in expanding its influence 
in the Asia-Pacific region post-Cold War. 
After losing India’s major trading partner 
with Russia due to the dissolution of Soviet 
Union, India needs new trading partners. 
India also needs to reconnect with SEA 
after three decades of ‘frosty relations’ that 
exist due to the ideological influence of the 
Cold War (Blank et al., 2015; Naidu, 2010). 
Therefore, finding new trading partners in 
SEA was the best option for India to expand 
its power because of the great potential 
of SEA in economy, security, politics and 
maritime sectors. Therefore, India launched 
its economic reforms and its new strategy 
Look East Policy (LEP) with the aim to 
establish economic and strategic ties with 
SEA states.
The introduction of the LEP in 1992 
marked a new direction in India’s policy 
toward the SEA region. It aimed to 
establish India as a “heavyweight player” 
in the region. There was no official doctrine 
or blueprint of government document 
specifying the principle of the LEP by the 
Indian government; it was only mentioned in 
Ministry of External Affairs Annual Report 
(1995, 1996). Most scholars agree that the 
objectives of the LEP are at least three-
fold involving multilateral engagements in 
politics, economic and defense. Forums for 
these engagements include the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), East 
Asia Summit (EAS) and ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) (Gupta, 2012; Jha, 2008; 
Naidu, 2004; Pandya & Malone, 2010; 
Rajendram, 2014). The main three objectives 
of the LEP are; first, to strengthen the 
political ties by institutionalizing linkages 
with ASEAN and its members; second, to 
increase economic engagement (i.e. in trade, 
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investment, technology and tourism); and 
third, to build strong defense and security 
relations with ASEAN members. 
There is no doubt that the motive of the 
LEP is driven much by the need for economic 
reform in India’s foreign relations with SEA 
states as highlighted by several scholars 
(Brewster, 2013; Haokip, 2011). Yet, 
scholars like Batabyal (2006), Hong (2007), 
Garver (2010), Muni and Mun (2012), 
Brewster (2013) and Pandya and Malone 
(2010) argued that the main objective of 
the LEP was not merely to expand India’s 
economic ties with SEA states but to 
obtain a strategic position in political and 
security relations to counter-balance China’s 
ascending power in the Asia-Pacific region. 
However, China had concerns towards 
the LEP, especially when “The People’s 
Daily” mentioned that India might intend 
to encircle China’s power through the LEP 
(Lakshminarayan, 2010). Despite India’s 
effort to be a regional economic power, 
the ‘overwhelming dominance’ of China in 
SEA forced India to take a more strategic 
role in non-economic dimensions such as 
in political, security, defense and maritime 
areas. The proclamation of the Act East 
Policy by India’s current Prime Minister 
as a new ‘phase’ of the LEP in 2015 looks 
promising. The new updated policy reflects 
India’s will to play a prominent strategic 
role in SEA and the Asia-Pacific region 
(Rajendram, 2014). The Act East Policy 
is paying further attention to the maritime 
security (Singh, 2018), focusing on building 
the Indian navy’s capability and promoting 
India’s naval interactions in the Asia-Pacific 
zone. 
This paper identifies two main patterns 
namely political partnership and security 
cooperation. The next two sections will 
dicuss these two patterns. The patterns 
are explored using multilateral institutions 
such as ASEAN-based organizations as the 
primary mechanisms adopted by India and 
SEA states to strengthen their political and 
security relationship.
Political Partnership
This section focuses on the pattern of 
political partnership between India and SEA 
states after 2003 through various regional 
mechanisms. Essentially, the political 
partnership between India and SEA states is 
an extension of their diplomatic relationship. 
It involves activities in regional mechanisms 
with ASEAN-based organizations, i.e. ARF 
and EAS, and promoting bilateral ties (Blank 
et al., 2015; Brewster, 2013; Naidu, 2004). 
India became a Sectoral-dialogue partner 
of ASEAN in 1992 and later became a full 
dialogue partner in 1995. The following 
year, India became a part of ARF and then 
became a full partner summit of ASEAN 
in 2002. The inclusion of India to EAS 
was supported by Thailand, Singapore, and 
Indonesia in 2005, despite China’s refusal 
(Scott, 2007). The inclusion is because of 
SEA states deem India as a heavyweight 
player and strategic partner in the region 
based on its growing economy and defense 
capabilities.
India and SEA states aim to deepen their 
political partnership in order to enhance 
confidence building, unite their views 
towards regional and international issues, 
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and to ensure India’s space in the SEA 
region. India’s inclusion to these institutions 
enhances its status as a major power (Blank 
et al., 2015). In this regard, the political 
partnership between India and SEA states 
is beneficial for both entities; it promotes 
peace and prosperity for the whole region. 
The growing political ties between India 
and SEA states have achieved prominent 
milestones. They signed two important 
treaties. Firstly, both parties signed the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) 
in the second India-ASEAN Summit in 
2003. The treaty is a full recognition to the 
sovereignty and the territorial integrity of 
SEA states and at the same time establishes 
an understanding of non-interference in 
internal affairs. For India, this is an important 
recognition to its role as a major player in 
the region through ASEAN (Ranjan, 2016) 
and a benign counterbalance to China in the 
region (Das, 2013). In sum, besides no latent 
activity, this treaty acknowledges SEA has a 
trustful ally and superpower vis-à-vis China. 
Secondly, India and SEA states released 
the Plan of Action (POA) in the Third India-
ASEAN Summit in 2004. This plan aims to 
implement the partnership between them for 
peace, progress and shared prosperity. From 
India’s perspective, the POA is a roadmap 
for developing and integrating their ties 
in the long-term (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of India, 2017). Most scholars 
such as  Amador et al. (2011) and Ranjan 
(2016) agree that the POA has laid a strong 
foundation for future relations between 
India and ASEAN. Therefore, the POA 
has been renewed twice (in 2010-2015 and 
2016-2020). The successful implementation 
of the POA is measured by a series of 
consultative meetings under dialogue 
and cooperation frameworks initiated by 
ASEAN. These meetings include ARF, EAS, 
the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference 
(PMC)+1 Sessions and ASEAN Economic 
Ministers+1 Consultations (Ministry of 
External Affairs of India, 2013). Most 
scholars like Amador et al., (2011) and 
Ranjan (2016) agree that the POA is a good 
achievement for both parties. The treaty is 
seen as a kind of recognition for both parties 
in gaining and maintaining mutual respect 
regarding territorial integrity. 
India could actively participate with SEA 
states through several regional engagements, 
such as the POA and TAC. Unfortunately, 
India could not fully implement some of the 
plans within these organizations because of 
the influence and affiliation of China with 
some SEA states. Due to this reason, India 
also could not reinforce its political ties 
with all of the SEA states. In spite of that, it 
appears that India and ASEAN are eager to 
find channels to expand their political and 
diplomatic relations. They are attempting 
to unite their perceptions and efforts to 
confront challenges that threaten their 
common interests. The participation of India 
into EAS is a kind of recognition of SEA 
states to India as a security player and as a 
guardian that provides peace and security. 
This is also a significant gesture for India 
to maintain the balance of regional power 
in the region vis-à-vis China’s power.
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Security Cooperation
This section examines the pattern of security 
cooperation through various regional 
mechanisms between India and SEA states 
post-2003. According to Indian External 
Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha, the security 
dimension has expanded significantly 
in the second phase of the LEP, whereas 
the first phase was mainly focused on the 
economic context (Ministry of External 
Affairs of India, 2003). As most scholars 
agree, the security engagements between 
India and SEA states primarily reflected 
India’s intention to counterweight China’s 
influence and implement its strategic role in 
the region (Amador et al., 2011; Guihong, 
2005; Scott, 2008, 2015). Although the 
cooperation is more on the basis of non-
traditional security, it has given a positive 
environment for SEA to enhance its regional 
role beyond security context as indicated by 
Amador et al. (2011) and Cook (2015). The 
security relations between India and SEA 
states developed according to maritime 
security and counter-terrorism since 2003 
( Arenla, 2014; Agnihotri, 2013; Brewster, 
2013; Mann, 2017). Therefore, the first part 
of the discussion in this section is going to 
emphasize maritime engagement and the 
second part focuses on counter-terrorism 
activities.
The security cooperation between India 
and SEA states has evolved in the maritime 
domain because of the assertiveness of 
China in the region. Some SEA states 
such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, 
Vietnam and Philippines, have maritime 
border disputes with China in the South 
China Sea (SCS). India established several 
naval engagements and initiatives with 
SEA navies due to the significance of the 
waterways of SEA region, beside the mutual 
concerns of them regarding safety of the 
waterways in the region and maintaining 
unfettered access. Bajpaee (2019), Naidu 
(2010) and Rajendram (2014) asserted 
that the increasing assertiveness of China 
was an essential factor to develop the 
security cooperation between India and 
SEA states, therefore, India enhanced its 
maritime engagements with SEA navies to 
protect its maritime interest in the region. 
Predominantly, the engagements of India and 
SEA states are through security cooperation 
with several regional mechanisms such as; 
ARF, EAS, ASEAN Defense Minister’s 
Meeting (ADMM-Plus), Indian Ocean Rim 
Association (IORA). They also have some 
bilateral engagements in few bilateral naval 
operations and exercises, especially with 
Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore 
and Thailand (Mann, 2017; Rajendram, 
2014). However, protecting the maritime 
border of the SEA region is imperative 
for India’s national interests and is an 
underlying reason to maintain its presence as 
a naval power. These kinds of efforts reflect 
a deep commitment and engagement to keep 
the region safe from any security threat.
In addition, both India and SEA states 
have collective efforts in ensuring safety 
along the maritime routes (Ladwig III, 
2010; Mohan, 2008; Pant, 2013; Rajendram, 
2014). They have increased their maritime 
interactions to minimize the security 
challenges caused by maritime terrorism, 
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smuggling and piracy. Thus, Indian and SEA 
navies have expanded their maneuvers along 
with the crucial choke points, especially 
the Malacca Strait and exchange their 
experience with military exercise personnel 
and pilots (Ladwig III, 2009; Pant, 2007). 
Moreover, India aims to keep this area free 
from any dominated powers or security 
threats because it is a part of its national 
interest. The Defense Minister of India 
stated that the “area of interest... extends 
from the north of the Arabian Sea to the 
South China Sea” (Asia Times, 2000). 
Therefore, India has participated in naval 
interactions with SEA navies in the Indian 
Ocean and South China Sea to protect its 
interests and compete with and counter 
against the influence of China in the region. 
Consequently, it appears that India’s 
activities provoke China. The country stated 
it had concerns about India’s intentions in 
the region (Ladwig III, 2009; Malik, 2012). 
China has suspected India since 2003 when 
it extended its operations to the South 
China Sea and initiated naval exercises in 
this region. China considers as a part of its 
periphery (Scott, 2007, 2008a). However, 
India is expanding its maritime status in the 
region to ensure the freedom of navigation 
in the area by preventing any power to 
undermine the regional security, moreover 
to exercise its influence in challenging 
China’s presence. 
India is trying to intensify its security 
engagements with the SEA region through 
various naval operations and exercises. 
China’s growing assertiveness in the SCS 
is the main factor to evolve the maritime 
engagements between India and SEA 
states, meanwhile the latter become more 
acceptable to expand the Indian naval 
presence to counter-balance China’s 
influence in the region (Bajpaee, 2019). 
India achieved remarkable steps (i.e. signed 
defense cooperation agreements with 
some of the SEA states such as; Malaysia, 
Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam 
and the Philippines, signed the agreement of 
strategic partnership with Vietnam in 2007 
and the agreement of naval cooperation 
with Singapore in 2017). The security 
engagements cover biennial activities such 
as a bilateral exercise with Singapore, and 
joint patrols with Indonesia and Thailand. 
Multilateral exercises conduct through 
MILAN1 with some SEA countries like 
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, 
and the Philippines since 1995 (Hong, 
2007; Rajendram, 2014). India also actively 
supports humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief activities in SEA states (such 
as in Tsunami casualties in Indonesia) to 
show her commitment as a “Net Security 
Provider” in a bigger strategic context to 
the region. The active and persistent of the 
naval presence of India through several 
maritime engagements and maneuvers in the 
SEA waters, perceive as efforts of India and 
SEA states to hedge-counter the influence 
of China in the region and to ensure the 
freedom of navigation along waterways, 
especially the Malacca Strait, Singapore 
Strait and the South China Sea. Therefore, 
1 MILAN is a congregation of littoral navies 
conducted biennially by the Indian Navy 
under the aegis of the Andaman and Nicobar 
Command.
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China perceived these security engagements 
and naval exercises between India and SEA 
as a way to contain its power in the region 
(People’s Daily Online, 2012). Despite the 
perception of China, India still actively 
engages in naval activities with SEA states 
to ensure the waterways remain safe and 
most importantly to curb China’s influence 
in the region. 
Counter-terrorism is another dimension 
of security cooperation between India and 
SEA states. Their engagement becomes 
more significant after 9/11 20012 in regard 
to counter-terrorism (Arenla, 2014; Pandya 
& Malone, 2010; Yong & Mun, 2009). Both 
entities have suffered from terrorist attacks. 
Indonesia experienced the Bali bomb blasts 
in 2003 and the Marriot Hotel in Jakarta 
in 2003 (Yong & Mun, 2009). India was 
also affected by terrorist attacks in India’s 
Parliament in 2001, and in Mumbai in 2008 
(Pant, 2010). As a result, they expressed 
their readiness to help each other. India and 
SEA states are trying to control the threats 
of terrorism by enhancing collaboration 
and consultation through regional forums. 
They utilize regional institutions like ARF, 
EAS, and ADMM-Plus to exchange their 
perspectives, experiences and unite their 
efforts against terrorism threats. 
After the incident of 9/11, security 
cooperation between India and SEA states 
is obviously aimed to handle security 
challenges like terrorism in the whole region 
(Amador et al., 2011; Pandya & Malone, 
2010). India and SEA states believe in 
2 The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center 
and the Pentagon in the United States.
their collective security and the necessity 
to gather their strength to confront mutual 
threats. Moreover, this cooperation gives 
more space to India to ensure its status as a 
predominant power and expand its area of 
influence. The Prime Minister of Malaysia in 
the first EAS in 2005 stated that “India has 
the potential of being an important partner 
in our region…we could encourage India 
to play its role in the promotion of peace, 
security, and stability in East Asia” (Muni, 
2012, p. 4). However, it appears that SEA 
states are convinced of the pivotal role of 
India to ensure the stability and peace in 
the region. Moreover, this role will possibly 
allow India to exercise a broad influence in 
the region, as it intends. 
The security cooperation between India 
and SEA states manifest by outstanding 
counter-terrorism movements (Arenla, 
2014; Naidu, 2010; Pandya & Malone, 
2010; Yong & Mun, 2009). India shows its 
intention to help SEA states to fight terrorism 
by signing an agreement to combat terrorism 
in 2003, which aims to prevent and combat 
international terrorism by exchanging 
information, intelligence and capacity-
building. India and SEA states confirm their 
readiness to counter-terrorism by gathering 
their capabilities. Through POA, India and 
SEA states recommended three major efforts 
of counter-terrorism (ASEAN, 2010, 2016). 
First is reinforcing training and consultation 
for maintaining efforts of capacity-building. 
Second is enhancing security cooperation in 
the field of border customs and transport to 
control the movement of terrorists across 
borders and cut off transferring materials 
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that are possibly used in terrorist attacks. 
Third is establishing institutions in sharing 
information and legal assistance for law 
implementation. India has strategic interests 
in this region and attempts to keep this region 
protected from any threat. The Indian Prime 
Minister Modi stated that “Our engagement 
with ASEAN…[is] driven by our common 
strategic priorities of securing our societies 
and bringing peace, stability, and prosperity 
to the region” (Ministry of External Affairs, 
2016). Overall, mutual concerns of India 
and SEA states in securing the region, and 
maritime borders in particular, demand 
consolidating their efforts to confront their 
mutual challenges. Their activities and 
initiatives may have relative success, but 
still there is no real action to undermine the 
non-traditional threat.
CONCLUSION 
In sum, because India made a significant 
attempt to maintain comprehensive and 
extensive relations with SEA states through 
political and security mechanisms regarding 
ASEAN and its regional mechanisms in 
the early 1990s (ARF, EAS, ASEAN-India 
Summit), India is positioned to protect 
the region and counter-balance China’s 
expansionist policy and behavior. Through 
the LEP, India actively expands its relations 
with SEA states and becomes a major power 
in the region. It is easy for SEA states to 
give a warm welcome to India to the region 
because of the historical connection, most 
importantly her capability in economy 
through long-lasting trade relationships and 
military strength. The growing relationship 
between India and SEA states in political 
and security fields reflect a momentum in 
their ties since 2003 and reflects a post-Cold 
War posture and outlook. The rising military 
power of China risks the regional security 
of the SEA region, therefore ASEAN and its 
multilateral mechanisms provide a platform 
for other regional powers to check-balance 
the power of China in the region (Kuik, 
2018). The invitation for India by ASEAN 
to be a member in EAS, despite the rejection 
of China in 2005, shows the recognition of 
SEA states towards India through security 
partnership. It also shows the ‘acceptance’ 
of the region to India’s essential role to be 
a player in the security architecture in the 
region. The political relations between India 
and SEA states look permanent since India 
became a full partner summit with ASEAN 
in 2002. The bilateral ties between India and 
SEA states are relatively weak considering 
solid relations of some SEA countries 
with China, such as Myanmar, Cambodia, 
and Laos but India intends to develop its 
relations with all the countries bilaterally 
and multilaterally to balance China’s role 
in the region.
After the Cold War, the relationship 
between India and SEA states improved 
significantly through ASEAN-based 
multilateral mechanisms in both security 
and maritime partnership. India was actively 
involved in several regional security 
institutions and in bilateral naval operations 
and exercises. In maritime security, India 
and SEA states demonstrated their collective 
commitment in maintaining the safety of 
maritime borders and the crucial choke 
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points (i.e. the Malacca Strait) in order to 
keep the region away from any dominant 
power, especially China. However, besides 
their readiness to cooperate with agreements 
on a few arrangements and mechanisms 
within security institutions such as EAS and 
ARF, their real commitment in minimizing 
terrorism threats in the region is still 
ambiguous. So far, there are no real physical, 
active or effective plans of counter terrorism 
from both parties. 
This paper shows that first, the pattern 
of the relations between India and SEA 
states is beyond the traditional move and it is 
more than ordinary strategic alliance. India 
employs its resources to be an active partner 
preparing for the long-term strategy in the 
Asia Pacific Region. Second, India and SEA 
states pursue robust and comprehensive 
mechanisms with the aim to protect the 
regional balance of power. Finally, China 
is an essential factor that boost the relations 
of India with SEA states, especially with 
the activities of China in the Indian Ocean 
Region, and the growing assertiveness in 
the South China Sea which considers as a 
part of national security of India, and it has 
to keep the stability of regional security and 
maintain the balance of power in the region. 
Overall, the strong political and security 
relationship between India and SEA states 
establish an “external balancing strategy” 
to counter-balance the position of China in 
the region. However, SEA states are turning 
to India as a counterweight of the power 
of China and US in this region. Based on 
this argument, the scenario of SEA region 
perhaps is in line with the proposition made 
by Ciociari (2008) that it is beyond balance 
of power, but more balance of great power 
influence.
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